Cue Competition in Human Associative Learning by McLaren, IPL et al.
Cue Competition in Human Associative Learning.  
 
R.P. McLaren1,  F.W. Jones2, F. Yeates1 & I.P.L. McLaren1 (i.p.l.mclaren@exeter.ac.uk)  
 
1School of Psychology, University of Exeter, UK. 
2Department of Applied Psychology, Canterbury Christ Church University, UK. 
 
 
Abstract 
There is a question as to whether cue competition effects can be 
observed in incidental learning paradigms in humans. The SRT 
and other location prediction tasks fall into that group often 
considered to show associative learning under incidental 
conditions.  We used a standard SRT task in which the 
preceding two trials of a run of three predicted the third 2/3 of 
the time, and added another predictive cue, a colored square, 
which could also stochastically predict the next response 
required. The question was to what extent would these two cues 
compete in terms of incidental learning to make the next 
response faster and more accurate than controls? We assessed 
this by comparing the dual cue group to a color only control and 
a sequence only control. Our results showed that all three groups 
learned, and that the dual group learned about both cues at least 
as well as the individual controls, but that when switched to a 
test phase where each cue could be assessed independently, the 
dual group showed a marked decline in performance relative to 
the color control. We interpret this as evidence for 
overshadowing occurring between the two predictive cues in the 
dual group, such that when combined their performance is 
equivalent or superior to either control, but when assessed 
independently, the color cue actually has a weaker association to 
the outcome than the equivalent cue in the control group. 
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Introduction 
Cue competition is one of the characteristic features of 
associative learning. Mackintosh (1976) showed that when a 
rat is trained with a combination of a light and a tone 
presented as a compound CS that predicts a shock US, then, 
while the animal learns to expect the shock US when the 
compound is presented, the animal shows less control of 
responding to the elements of the compound when they are 
presented individually in a test phase. We say that the two 
cues overshadow one another, and compete for associative 
strength to the US, such that the amount of associative 
strength accruing to either cue is less than if it had been 
trained on its own. Many studies have shown 
overshadowing between different CSs in animals such as the 
rat and the pigeon. The question addressed here is whether 
we can be confident that a similar phenomenon occurs in 
humans. This is an important point for those who wish to 
argue that humans and infra-humans share associative 
processes in common, and that we can understand this 
component of human learning and memory by studying 
other animals.  
On the face of it, the answer to this question is a 
resounding "yes", based on the research currently available. 
To take a simple and rather common example, if we ask 
people to learn whether or not an allergic reaction occurs 
when a hypothetical patient eats meals made up of various 
food combinations, then they will happily do so by trial and 
error. If we then ask them to rate the foods for their 
propensity to bring about an allergic reaction in the patient, 
those foods trained individually will tend to be given higher 
ratings than those trained in compound with another food 
(e.g. see Le Pelley and McLaren, 2001), thus demonstrating 
a basic overshadowing effect. But there are a number of 
reasons why this result (which has been reported by many 
laboratories many times) is not as secure as it may seem. 
The first of these is that, in many cases, it is difficult to be 
sure that the result is due to associative processes rather than 
cognitive inference based on a heuristic of the type "if there 
are two cues predicting the outcome, then credit for this 
prediction must be shared between them". Researchers who 
subscribe to the view that humans possess a dual system 
capability when it comes to learning (as we do, see 
McLaren, Green and Mackintosh, 1994, for a summary), 
must take seriously the need to ensure that associative 
processes are being studied in a relatively pure form if 
statements about associative processing are to be made on 
the basis of that study.  The Le Pelley and McLaren result 
already mentioned is perhaps one of the cases where this 
criticism might not apply, because in those experiments the 
authors were at pains to use conditions (high memory load 
due to using many cues and trial by trial presentation) that 
had been shown to encourage associative processing (see Le 
Pelley, Oakeshott and McLaren, 2005 for a discussion of 
this issue and a demonstration that these procedures are 
effective). But in many other cases, where few cues are used 
and memory load is low, the rating given may well owe 
more to cognitive inference than associative learning. 
A second issue is that the stimuli that serve as the CSs in 
these experiments are too similar in kind, in that they are 
both foods. The analogy would be to an animal experiment 
in which the overshadowing was demonstrated to two tones, 
rather than a tone and a light. The former might give rise to 
concerns that the two tones when played together interacted 
in some way so as to change their stimulus quality, and that 
this interaction was lost when presented individually, so that 
the reduction in rating that occurred on test could be 
explained by some change in the perceived stimulus. No 
such process would apply when the stimuli were trained 
alone. It would clearly be better if the two CSs were 
different in kind so that this type of potential confound 
could be avoided.  
A final point worth raising is that in all the experiments 
(that we are aware of) that have studied overshadowing that 
come close to meeting our first two objections, the 
comparison has been between CSs trained in compound and 
tested individually, and a group or groups trained with the 
individual CSs and then tested. The problem with this 
procedure is that one group experiences a major change 
from training to test (the compound group) whereas the 
other does not. This, on its own, may be enough to depress 
responding in the compound group if they come to believe 
that circumstances have changed and deliberately alter their 
responses as a consequence (something that seems 
intuitively less likely to be the case in a rat or a pigeon). 
Once all these three objections are taken into account, we 
are unaware of any study that can be said to establish the 
existence of overshadowing as a characteristic of associative 
processing in humans. 
 
Experiment  
Shortly, we will describe a design that answers the three 
objections we have raised to existing demonstrations of 
overshadowing in humans. We start by considering what 
might be expected under compound training. If cues A and 
B are trained to predict an outcome, O, then an associative 
analysis analogous to that offered in animal learning studies 
states that both A and B will acquire associative strength for 
the outcome, O, but that this will be such that, when tested 
individually, responding to either element of the compound 
will be weaker than to the compound itself. We could add 
that responding to elements that had been trained 
individually would be expected to be stronger, on test, than 
that for elements trained in compound, and that the drop in 
performance from training to test would be much less (if 
any occurred at all) for these individually trained cues than 
for those trained in compound. With these characteristics of 
overshadowing clear in our minds, we can now turn to 
considering the details of a design that would enable us to 
test some of these predictions. 
Our two classes of cue are chosen to have quite distinct 
characteristics. We will employ a basic SRT paradigm 
similar to that of Willingham, Nissen and Bullemer (1989), 
in which there are two circles that define two stimulus 
locations, left and right. The circles are outlines at the start 
of a trial, then one of them fills, and the corresponding key 
has to be pressed. This gives us a fast-paced choice RT task 
that allows little time for reflection. Unknown to our 
participants, in those groups that are given sequential 
information, there is a 2/3 chance of a trial being predicted 
by the two preceding trials. The rule is that if the two 
preceding trials are both the same, then that trial is likely to 
be a left, whereas if they are different, it is likely to be a 
right, with these response assignations counterbalanced 
across participants. Thus, the first type of cue is provided by 
the sequence of locations that occur / responses required. 
Our second cue type is provided by a colored square that 
flashes up before the circle fills in, at fixation between the 
two circles. Participants that receive color information have 
a 3/4 chance that the color will predict the response location 
on half the trials. On the other half of trials different colors 
are used that are not predictive and so can be used as color 
control trials. We settled on these parameters for the tasks as 
a result of extensive piloting and prior work, to ensure that 
both the sequential information and the color information 
were capable of supporting learning. 
There are three groups in this experiment. Group Dual has 
both sequence and color information programmed in. Group 
Color has the same type of color information as Group 
Dual, and Group Sequence has the same type of sequence 
information as Group Dual. These last two groups will serve 
as our controls. Group Sequence are still shown a colored 
square just before the response location is indicated, but the 
color bears no relation to that location; equally Group Color 
experiences sequences of trials in just the same way as 
Group Dual, but these are not predictive. The point is that 
all groups experience a fast-paced sequence of trials cued by 
a colored square during both training and test, and so there 
should be no difference in their experience, except that 
brought about by the contingencies, and no obvious 
difference between training and test. 
 
Method 
Participants 
90 University of Exeter students participated in this 
experiment, with ages ranging from 18-35. They were either 
given 1 course credit or paid £5 for a one hour session. 	  
Stimuli 
 These were displayed on an iMac computer with 
participants seated about 70cm from the screen. The display 
consisted of two outline white circles (the two choice SRT 
stimuli) and a white outline square (which would become 
the color stimulus) on a black background. The circles had a 
diameter of 1.9 cm, and the square was also 1.9cm on a side 
and positioned in between the two circles, which were 2.2 
cm to the right and left of its center respectively so as to be 
separated by the same distance as in Jones and McLaren 
(2009). The color stimuli were 1.9 cm square blocks of 
color that replaced the outline square just before one of the 
circle outlines filled. The colors used could be any one of 
red, green, blue or yellow. The signal to respond was given 
by a white filled circle 1.9 cm in diameter replacing one of 
the outline circles. Participants had to press a key on the 
side that the filled circle appeared, using either the 'X' (for 
left) or '.' (for right) keys on a QWERTY keyboard. 	   	  
Design 
The experiment consisted of three equal sized groups 
(Dual, Color alone and Sequence alone) of participants who 
each experienced 18 blocks (16 training and 2 test) of a two-
choice SRT task over the course of an hour. For Group 
Color, during training the sequences were pseudo-random. 
This was accomplished by taking the 8 different triplet 
subsequences possible (RRR, RRL, RLR, RLL, LRR, LRL, 
LLR, LLL) and concatenating them in a random order to 
make a block of trials with equal numbers of each triplet in 
it. Two of the four colors were 75% accurate in predicting 
the response location (the other two colors were 50:50; see 
Yeates, Jones, Wills, Aitken and McLaren, 2012 for details). 
This part of our paradigm was based on that developed by 
Aitken (1996). For Group Sequence, during training the four 
colors were 50:50 in predicting the response location, but 
the sequences that could occur were now constrained so that 
only four of the possible eight triplets were used to construct 
any given training block. The four triplets used had to 
conform to the rule, "if the first two trials are the same then 
the third is X, but if they are different then it is Y" where X 
could be one of L or R, and Y was the complementary 
response. Thus, one participant in this group might receive 
training blocks constructed by randomly concatenating eight 
of each of the triplets LLL, LRR, RLR and RRL to make a 
block of 96 trials. This has the effect of making the response 
location required predictable 2/3 of the time on average (see 
Jones and McLaren, 2009 for more details on this method). 
Group Dual simply had both sequence and color 
information, arranged so that when the sequential 
information was guaranteed to be predictive (on every third 
trial) so was the color information, thus maximising the 
correlation between the two cues. This arrangement ensured 
that the two cues were in agreement and predictive on 71% 
of trials on which one of them occurred, which compares 
well with their overall contingent relationship to the 
response location (sequence, 67%; color, 75%). Note that 
we ensured that the colors that were predictive in Group 
Dual occurred on the third trials in Group Sequence (but 
split 50:50 by response location so that they were not 
predictive), so that we could pick out these dummy 
"predictive color trials" and compare them to Group Dual to 
allow an estimate of color learning uncontaminated by 
sequence learning. In a similar fashion, we also ensured that 
the predictive colors for Group Color occurred on third 
trials (but the sequences were in a 50:50 relationship with 
the response location), so that we could use these trials as 
controls to assay a relatively pure measure of sequence 
learning in Group Dual. Previous work from our laboratory 
suggests that participants do not learn about the special 
status of third trials (e.g. Jones & McLaren, 2009). 
After 16 blocks of training, participants went straight into 
a two-block test phase with no further instructions or 
indication that anything had changed. Both color and 
sequence information was now entirely non-predictive 
(50:50 in all cases) and uncorrelated with one another.. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to fixate on the square outline, 
and to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to the 
circle fills. They were told that the square would fill in with 
a color to warn them that the next response location was 
about to be signalled. No mention of any contingent 
relationships was given to any of the groups in this 
experiment. Thus, the order of events for a trial was that a 
colored square appeared centre-screen, and then after a 
variable interval of 250-500 msec one of the circles filled. 
These stimuli remained until a response was made then 
cleared, leaving the circle and square outlines for a 250 
msec RSI until the next trial started. If participants pressed 
the wrong key, a beep sounded to inform them of their error. 
At the end of the experiment participants were interviewed 
to determine if they had noticed any relationship between 
the colored squares and the response location, or that any of 
the sequences were predictive, then paid and thanked. 
 
Results 
Both RTs (for correct responses) and errors were recorded 
and analysed for both the training and test phases of the 
experiment. Sequence learning was analysed by comparing 
performance on the trained sequences to performance on the 
other set of four sequences. Thus, the sum of the mean RTs 
(or errors) for the trained sequences was subtracted from the 
sum of the mean RTs (or errors) of the complementary set. 
This measure has an expected value of 0, where higher 
positive scores indicate learning. It controls for sequential 
effects because both sets of four sequences contain the same 
set of transitions, simply transposing left and right 
responses, and so gives an unbiased measure of sequence 
learning. Our measure for color learning was to compute the 
mean RT (or error rate) for the predictive color trials and 
subtract this from the mean RT (or errors) of the control 
color trials. We did not use the inconsistent predictive color 
trials (the 25% that were "wrong") as our comparison, 
because there were relatively few such trials, making any 
such measure rather variable.  
Figure 1. The top panel displays the mean differences 
(untrained sequences–trained sequences) for RTs. The 
bottom panel shows the equivalent error differences.  
 
Sequence learning 
We begin with an analysis of the sequential information. 
Figure 1 shows the mean difference between trained and 
untrained sequences in RTs (top panel) and errors (bottom 
panel) for each of the three groups over training and on test.	  
Higher scores indicate more learning, so we can see that 
over the course of training both the Sequence and Dual 
groups show good evidence of sequence learning as 
measured by RTs and errors, whereas there is little learning 
in the Color control group as far as sequences are 
concerned. This impression is confirmed by planned 
comparisons against an expected value of 0, for Group 
Sequence RT differences, F(1,29)=20.54, p<.001, for the 
error differences, F(1,29)=36.32, p<.001; for Group Dual, 
F(1,29)=28.62, p<.001 (RTs), F(1,29)=37.79, p<.001 
(errors); and for Group Color, max F=2.87, p=ns. Turning 
now to the Test phase, a similar pattern emerges, though 
reliability is weaker. Group Sequence, F(1,29)=2.17, p=ns 
(RTs), and F(1,29)=5.35, p=.028. (errors). Group Dual has 
F(1,29)=12.74, p<.005. (RTs), F(1,29)=2.03, p=ns. (errors), 
and Group Color has max F(1,29)<1. The reduction in 
reliability is not entirely unexpected given that the test 
phase is, in fact, an extinction treatment that will degrade 
the learning that has already taken place. Nevertheless, the 
evidence for sustained performance on the basis of what has 
been learned during training in Group Sequence and Group 
Dual, is something that we shall return to. 
 
Color learning 
Turning now to the color data, Figure 2 shows plots of the 
difference scores obtained by comparing performance for 
the predictive colors with the control colors for RTs and 
errors. In the case of Group Sequence, the ‘predictive 
colors’ are the same colors as those used in matched 
participants in Group Dual, such that the two groups are 
identical except that color has no predictive value in Group 
Sequence. The color assignments in Group Sequence were 
set by swapping occurrences of one predictive color (say red 
which predicted a left response) in a given Group Dual 
participant, with the other predictive color (say green which 
predicted a right response) until they no longer predicted a 
left or right response.  
Analysis of these scores against an expected value of 0 
reveals that, over the course of training, Group Sequence 
shows significant evidence of learning in the RTs (see later 
for an explanation), F(1,29)=10.06, p<.005, and also in the 
errors F(1,29)=12.33, p<.005; Group Dual shows learning 
in the RTs, F(1,29)=4.32, p<.05, and an effect in the errors, 
F(1,29)=25.07, p<.001. Group Color has a more complex 
pattern of effects. The error differences show significant 
learning, F(1,29)=12.84, p<.005, but the RT differences 
show an effect in the opposite direction, F(1,29)=20.95, 
p<.001. This suggests some form of speed/accuracy trade-
off, with participants in this group slowing down on the 
predictive colors and making fewer errors. The reason they 
slow down on the predictive colors, might be that it is on 
these colors that they tend to make errors, as they are 
inconsistent on 25% of their occurrences. We can check by 
looking at performance on the inconsistent color trials. 
 
Figure 2. The top panel displays the mean differences 
(control colors–predictive colors) for RTs. The bottom panel 
shows the equivalent error differences. 
 
If we do this then we find no evidence for slowing relative 
to controls, however, although there is a high error rate 
compared to consistent trials. Given this, we at present have 
no explanation for this speed/accuracy trade-off. 
The reason why a similar slowing effect was not observed 
in Group Dual could be because in that group the effect is a 
joint one, as sequence and color information are highly 
correlated. Hence, the analysis of the color effect just given 
for Group Dual is highly likely to be contaminated by 
sequence learning. We can control for this by making use of 
the fact that the Group Sequence data has exactly the same 
sequence information as Group Dual, but none of the color 
information. This is why there is some evidence of learning 
during training in the color information analysis for that 
group. It simply reflects the correlated effect of sequence 
learning. If we contrast Group Sequence against Group Dual 
using the color scores shown in Figure 2 for training, then 
we find that whilst there is no significant effect in the RTs, 
there is one in the errors F(1,58)=9.74, p<.005. Hence, we 
can conclude that there has been learning of the color 
information in Group Dual over and above any effect of 
learning about the sequences.  
There is a similar analysis we can do to check that 
participants in Group Dual actually learned the sequence 
information and were not simply relying on color to predict 
the next response location. This time we compare the 
sequence scores in Group Dual to the color scores in Group 
Color, as the latter give the maximum effect that could be 
expected if color information was all that was driving the 
effect in Group Dual. There is no significant difference 
between the error differences (the difference is zero to two 
decimal places), but a highly significant effect in the RTs, 
F(1,58)=48.92, p<.0001. We can safely conclude that Group 
Dual learns something about the sequence structure in 
addition to what it learns about the ability of the colors to 
predict the next response location.  
Finally, we can assess whether Group Dual learned more, 
overall, during training than the two control groups. If we 
contrast learning on the sequence measure for Dual vs. 
Sequence then we find that there is a numerical trend in that 
direction in both RTs and errors, but neither is significant 
(Fs<1). Turning to the color data, if we contrast Dual vs. 
Color then there is a significant advantage for Dual in the 
RT differences, F(1,58)=15.02, p<.005, and a trend in the 
same direction in the errors, F(1,58)=3.26, p=.076. 
Analysis of the Test phase reveals a somewhat different 
pattern for the color data to that seen in the sequence 
measure, as there is a precipitate drop in performance by 
Group Dual, but this time maintained performance by 
Group Color. Only Group Color shows a significant effect, 
in the RT differences, F(1,29)=6.61, p=.016, this time with 
the error trend in the same direction. In fact, there is no 
evidence of any deterioration in effect in Group Color from 
training to test, but there is a substantial drop in 
performance in Group Dual so that it is numerically (though 
not significantly) in the wrong direction for learning (i.e. 
slower and more error prone on what were the predictive 
color trials).   
The question that we must address now is whether there is 
evidence that Group Dual shows less learning on test than 
the appropriate controls. Some of the trends are certainly in 
this direction: For sequential information, contrasts of 
Group Dual against Sequence on the test data give Fs<1 for 
both RT and the error differences, so here performance in 
Group Dual is indistinguishable from that in the control 
group. But contrasting the color scores for Group Dual 
against Group Color on test gives an F(1,58)=5.34, p=.024 
in the RT differences, and a numerical trend in the same 
direction in the error differences. Thus, we have 
significantly less learning exhibited on test in Group Dual 
than in the controls, even though there was strong evidence 
for learning of both color and sequence information in 
Group Dual during training. 
 
General Discussion 
 
We can summarize our findings by noting that there is 
good evidence that Group Dual learned to use both color 
and sequence information to predict the next response 
location. Group Sequence learned to use the sequence 
information available, and Group Color the color 
information available (though here the evidence is 
somewhat mixed, and only resolved by looking at the test 
data). Overall, Group Dual was better than one of our two 
control groups (Group Color) at predicting the next response 
location during training, but worse on test compared to this 
control and indistinguishable from the other. What are we to 
make of this pattern of results? 
We would argue that this pattern is one that is consistent 
with associatively-based cue competition in all three groups. 
The corollary of this position is that a cue does not have to 
be predictive to enter into cue competition, but does so 
automatically if it is present. In what follows we offer a 
simple error correcting analysis based on elemental 
representations of the type posited by McLaren, Kaye and 
Mackintosh (1989) and further developed in McLaren and 
Mackintosh (2000, 2002), in conjunction with the SRN 
architecture developed by Elman (1990) and further refined 
by Cleeremans and McClelland (1991).  But a similar 
analysis follows from the use of Rescorla and Wagner type 
models (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972), or configural models 
such as Pearce (1987), or hybrid models such as McLaren, 
Forrest and McLaren (2012). In short, we believe that our 
analysis is generally applicable and speaks to something 
fundamental about associative learning in humans. 
If we begin with both control groups, and take Group 
Color as an example, then what happens is that an 
association builds up from the representation of the 
predictive colors to a representation of the contingent 
stimulus location, over the course of training. This is simple 
enough, and a similar thing happens in Group Sequence as 
the sequential contingencies are learned, though here a 
recurrent architecture is needed to allow our model to 
capture these contingencies. But the non-contingent 
sequence information (in Group Color) and color 
information (in Group Sequence) is also present on each 
trial. Because of this, it will also form essentially spurious 
associations with representations of stimulus locations, and 
act as "noise", slowing learning of the contingent 
information. Group Dual does not suffer from this problem.  
Both types of information are predictive, and are learned. 
Other things being equal, we can expect learning to proceed 
more rapidly to this combination of cues, but the association 
to either cue alone will be less than is developed in the 
group where that is the only contingent cue because of 
overshadowing. This simply reflects the idea that there is an 
asymptotic net associative strength needed to predict an 
outcome in an error correcting system. If two cues are 
involved, then they have to split this maximum associative 
strength between them. But if only one is present, then, even 
if learning is slower, it can eventually achieve an associative 
strength that is nearer that maximum, which is in excess of 
that achieved in the dual cue case. Hence, on test, when 
each cue's associative strength is independently evaluated, 
the prediction is that Group Dual cues will show less 
evidence of learning than the control groups, as was the case 
in our study. 
Of course, this is not quite the pattern of results we have 
obtained in our experiment, and here we have recourse to 
the idea that the sequence information is a stronger, more 
salient cue than the color information in our experiment. 
Because of this, the sequence cues overshadow the color 
cues to some extent and acquire a disproportionate share of 
the associative strength available. This still leaves Group 
Dual with an overall somewhat higher associative strength 
compared to either control, but the decrement on test when 
the sequential and color-based information are decoupled is 
particularly sever for the latter (see Mackintosh, 1976 for a 
demonstration of the asymmetric effects obtained when cues 
of differential salience are trained in compound). 
We do not believe that our demonstration of 
overshadowing is contaminated by any kind of cognitive 
inference because the task was fast paced, allowing little 
opportunity for reflection, and our post-experiment 
questionnaire indicated that none of our participants were 
aware of the contingencies in play. We do not believe that 
there was any cognitive or sensory interference between our 
two types of cue because they are quite different in nature 
and occupy different domains of representation. We also do 
not believe that participants changed the way they 
responded on test, because there was no indication of 
entering a test phase, and participants in all groups 
experienced a similar degradation in contingency. For all 
these reasons, we believe that our results give good reason 
to take the view that overshadowing occurs in human 
associative learning, and that it occurs automatically. 
   
Conclusion 
One of the fundamental questions about human learning is 
whether it can have an associative component similar to that 
found in other animals. Our results indicate that learning 
under incidental conditions, learning that is automatic and 
not based on verbaliseable knowledge, is subject to the 
phenomenon known as overshadowing in the animal 
learning literature. This strengthens the case for people 
possessing associative processes in addition to other rule-
based processes as part of their cognitive machinery. 
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